By Jesse Fairbanks

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is planning a pilot program to provide direct rental assistance to some people who are eligible for housing choice vouchers (HCVs). Giving cash instead of vouchers to eligible renters is a monumental change that signals trust in HCV participants. While this change has the potential to simplify the program, the pilot could endanger participating tenants in some states by removing oversight of housing quality. The pilots therefore need to be combined with strengthened protections for tenants nationwide.

HCVs currently assist over five million people in approximately 2.3 million households. Unlike public housing, HCVs depend on the private rental market to supply housing. People participating in the HCV program pay 30 percent of their income to rent a unit from a private landlord, and their voucher generally covers the rest. Unfortunately, the program doesn’t work so simply for most eligible people.

HCVs are unreliable for two major reasons. First, the program is severely underfunded. Only one in four people who are eligible receive a voucher. Applicants remain on the waitlist upward of two years. Second, a person’s ability to use their voucher depends on conditions outside of their control such as landlord participation or local housing markets. As a result, HCVs are the most challenging public benefit to use. One federal study estimated that 40 percent of people who receive a voucher are unable to find a unit, and lose their voucher.

Finding affordable, quality housing that meets an entire family’s needs and is owned by a landlord willing to accept a voucher can feel impossible.

Because vouchers depend on the private market, landlords have significant power to decide whether people with vouchers can use their benefits. Average rents often exceed the amount that public housing authorities are willing to subsidize in places where landlords rapidly raise rents. Many landlords just choose not to participate in the HCV program, citing burdens such as the housing quality inspection. They are legally allowed to refuse vouchers as payment in a majority of states or cities. The fundamental power imbalance between landlords and tenants that harms all people navigating the private rental market also prohibits the HCV program from serving more people.

HUD’s proposed design for direct rental assistance could eliminate some of the excuses landlords give for not participating in the program. It could also increase participants’ autonomy during the housing search.

Under HUD’s design, households selected for a voucher would receive funds by direct deposit from a public housing agency. Each household would then be responsible for paying the full rent to their landlord. A well-designed pilot that deposits money for rent directly into HCV participants’ bank accounts would demonstrate trust in people who receive public benefits, signaling that they are deserving of the community’s help. In contrast, programs that monitor or restrict how people can use their assistance imply that recipients are too incompetent to help themselves. Centering recipients’ autonomy in program design supports the broader narrative shift we need to make programs anti-racist.

However, simply providing cash instead of a voucher won’t help tenants find a unit, as landlords will still know they receive assistance. Many landlords refuse to rent to people participating in the HCV program because of racist or classist stereotypes about people who receive public benefits as not being “quality” tenants. These property owners will continue to find workarounds to discriminate against people with vouchers in places without strong source-of-income protections.

HUD’s proposed design could increase landlord participation by eliminating two of the requirements they find burdensome. For households that received direct rental assistance, there wouldn’t need to be a Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract between the landlord and the public housing agency because the tenant would issue the full rent payment. Additionally, the tenant would bear primary responsibility for inspecting the unit. Landlords would no longer be asked to leave their units empty until a lengthy inspection and all repairs deemed necessary by the public housing authority are completed, which landlords claim reduces their profits.

There is valid concern among advocates that weakening housing authorities’ oversight during the housing search will expose more tenants to substandard living conditions. Federal data suggest a little over 3 percent of renters with very low incomes endure severe maintenance issues such as inadequate plumbing, but the potential consequences are life-threatening for people who do. These violations are more common in places with older housing stock or weak laws enforcing habitability standards. They’re also challenging to detect with an untrained eye. Rather than unilaterally eliminate the inspection, housing authorities should be encouraged to allow recipients to determine the most appropriate inspection process for themselves, providing several options such as having a professional inspector double-check the unit after they’ve moved in.

All of these changes would make the experience of renting as an HCV participant more similar to the experience of someone without assistance. This shift may disadvantage recipients in places without strong laws protecting or empowering tenants.

For example, tenants in almost 20 states are not legally allowed to withhold rent when a landlord fails to supply quality housing as written in a lease or local law. Strong rent-withholding laws enable tenants to more safely band together and organize rent strikes if a landlord refuses to bargain with them. These laws are a significant source of power for tenants determined to improve their housing quality. Roughly the same number of states don’t permit tenants to repair maintenance issues and deduct the costs from the rent, either. In theory, a pilot that provides cash instead of vouchers could harmonize with laws that empower tenants to withhold rent when a landlord fails to provide safe housing. But state laws differ dramatically. HCV recipients in places with weak tenant protections may need a HAP contract to preserve minimal rights to a safe home.

The changes HUD has proposed will not right the imbalance of systemic power between landlords and tenants at the core of HCVs’ ineffectiveness. With the rollout of these pilots, the Biden-Harris Administration must explore administrative levers available to standardize tenant protections for people in federally assisted housing, while also pressuring Congress to pass a national tenants’ bill of rights.